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REGULATORY AND FACTUAL
FRAMEWORK.
A. PARTIES.
EnerProg, L.L.C., operates the Moutard Electric Generating
Station (MEGS), a coal-fired steam electric power plant, located in
Fossil, Progress. EnerProg was issued a renewed Clean Water Act
(CWA) National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES) permit for the continued operation of MEGS. EnerProg
filed comments on the MEGS NPDES permit renewal. EnerProg
petitioned the Environmental Appeals Board (EAB) challenging
the renewed NPDES permit. EnerProg’s petition for review was
denied by the EAB. EnerProg appeals the EAB’s decision herein.
Fossil Creek Watchers, Inc. (FCW), is an environmental
group concerned with the environmental impacts of the Moutard
Electric Generating Station. FCW filed comments on the MEGS
NPDES permit renewal. FCW petitioned the EAB challenging the
renewed NPDES permit, but the petition was denied. FCW appeals
the EAB’s decision herein. The court has already determined that
FCW has standing to pursue judicial review of the permit.
United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
is the federal agency responsible for enforcing and administering
select environmental laws and regulations. Its mission is to protect
human health and the environment. MEGS is located in Fossil,
Progress, within the jurisdiction of EPA Region XII. There is no
state delegated NPDES program. Therefore, EPA Region XII
issued the renewed NPDES permit for the continued operation of
MEGS. EPA Region XII included conditions from the CWA Section
401 Certification issued by the State of Progress in the final
permit. The Region XII permit writer also relied on Best
Professional Judgment as an alternative ground for requiring
MEGS to implement dry handling of bottom and fly ash wastes in
order to achieve zero discharge of toxic pollutants. The petitioners
named the United States Environmental Protection Agency as the
respondent in their petitions to review the final decision of the
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Environmental Appeals Board. The respondent may be referred to
as EPA or Region XII, herein.
B. OVERVIEW OF APPLICABLE LEGAL AUTHORITY.
This case is an appeal from a final decision of the
Environmental Appeals Board affirming the re-issuance of a final
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit. The
parties raise issues stemming from two legal authorities: 1) the
Clean Water Act; and 2) the Administrative Procedure Act. The
Clean Water Act issues, in short, are: 1) the inclusion of conditions
as a part of the section 401 certification; 2) the permit writer’s
reliance on Best Professional Judgment as an alternative ground
for zero discharge requirements; and 3) whether a NPDES permit
and a section 404 dredge and fill permit are required for the coal
ash pond. The Administrative Procedure Act issues concern
whether the suspension of two provisions were effective, as they
pertain to requirements related to this NPDES permit. These
claims will be discussed in greater detail in sections IV through
VIII, below.
The first major federal law addressing water pollution was the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948, which became
commonly known as the Clean Water Act after amendments made
in 1977.1 The objective of the Clean Water Act “is to restore and
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the
Nation’s waters.” 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2012). In order to meet this
objective, the Clean Water Act sets the goals of eliminating the
discharge of pollutants into navigable waters and attaining a
water quality that provides for waters to be both swimmable and
fishable. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1), (2).
To effectuate these goals, section 301 sets forth the basic
prohibition of the Clean Water Act: “the discharge of any pollutant
[into waters of the United States] by any person shall be unlawful”
without a permit. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a). See also 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1342(k), 1344(p); 40 C.F.R. § 122.2(a) (2017). Permits are issued
under two permitting schemes: 1) section 402 National Pollutant

1. For more on the history of the Clean Water Act, see U.S. EPA, History of
the Clean Water Act, https://www.epa.gov/laws-regulations/history-clean-wateract (last visited Oct. 27, 2017).
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Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits; and 2) section
404 dredge and fill permits.
Section 402 of the Clean Water Act established a permitting
scheme that authorizes the discharge of pollutants into navigable
waters from point sources, called the National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES). 33 U.S.C. § 1342. NPDES permits
include effluent limitations applicable to the specific applicant and
associated pollutant discharges, a compliance schedule, and
monitoring and reporting requirements. Effluent limitations limit
the amount or concentration of a particular pollutant that may be
discharged. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 122.44, 122.45. Effluent limitations
are derived from water quality standards or technology-based
standards. Water quality standards seek to achieve water quality
that precisely meets the desired goals of a particular water body.
See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c); 40 C.F.R. § 131.2. These standards are
adopted by states and approved by the EPA. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1313(c)(2)(A). Technology-based standards are promulgated as
effluent limitation guidelines (ELGs) on an “industry-by-industry”
basis. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b). The EPA selects a particular technology
on which to base a guideline, based on the category of pollutant or
point source. Members of that industry need not use that specific
technology, rather they must meet the standards achieved by the
selected technology. Where a promulgated effluent limitation is
lacking for an industry or sub-category of industry or for a specific
pollutant, the permit writer may exercise Best Professional
Judgment (BPJ) to determine an appropriate effluent limitation.
40 C.F.R. § 125.3(c)(3).
Section 404 sets forth a permitting scheme, administered by
the United States Army Corps of Engineers (“Army Corp”), for
activities that result in “the discharge of dredged or fill material
into the navigable waters at specified disposal sites.” 33 U.S.C.
§ 1344(a). These permits may be denied upon a determination
“that the discharge of such materials into such area will have an
unacceptable adverse effect on municipal water supplies, shellfish
beds and fisher areas . . . , wildlife or recreational areas.” 33 U.S.C.
§ 1344(c).
Applicants for permits under the Clean Water Act must also
receive a certification from the state within which the discharge
will originate:
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Any applicant for a Federal license or permit to conduct any
activity including, but not limited to, the construction or operation
of facilities, which may results in any discharge into the navigable
waters, shall provide the licensing or permitting agency a
certification from the State. . . that any such discharge will comply
with the applicable provisions of sections 1311, 1312, 1313, 1316,
and 1317 of this title.
33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1). The federal agency issuing the permit,
generally, must either include the section 401 certification
conditions or reject the issuance of the permit. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(d)
(. . . shall become a condition on any Federal license of permit
subject to the provisions of this section.”). Section 401(d) describes
what can be included in the section 401 certification and is
described further in section IV, infra.
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) governs how
administrative agencies can develop and issue regulations. 5
U.S.C. § 551 et seq. The purpose of the APA is “[t]o improve the
administration of justice by prescribing fair administrative
procedure.” APA, Pub. L. No. 404, 60 Stat. 237, ch. 324 (June 11,
1946). Relevant to this case, section 553 describes the basic process
for notice and comment rulemaking, and when such process is
applicable. 5 U.S.C. § 553. A more detailed description of this
requirement is included in section V(C), infra. “The notice-andcomment procedure assures that the public and the persons being
regulated are given an opportunity to participate, provide
information, and suggest alternatives so that the agency is
educated about the impact of a proposed rule and can make a fair
and mature decision.” Alexa L. Ashworth et al., 2 FED. PROC., L.
ED. § 2:80 (2017). The APA also sets forth the standard of review
that the Twelfth Circuit must apply when reviewing the decision
of the EAB. 5 U.S.C. § 706. See section III, infra.
1. List of Applicable
Provisions:

Statutory

and

Regulatory

CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 – Congressional declaration of goals
and policy
CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1311 – effluent limitations
CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1341 – state certification
CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 – NPDES permits

5
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CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 – dredge and fill permits
CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b) – judicial review
40 C.F.R. § 121.2 – state certification
40 C.F.R. § 125.3(c)(3) – Best Professional Judgment
40 C.F.R. § 122.2 – NPDES definitions
33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b)(1) - Army Corps definition of WOTUS
40 C.F.R. § 124.19 – EAB review
APA, 5 U.S.C. § 705 – relief pending judicial review
APA, 5 U.S.C. § 553 – rulemaking
APA, 5 U.S.C. § 551(5) – rulemaking definition
APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706 – standard of review
28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) – statute of limitations for civil suits v.
United States
2. List of Agency Guidance Documents:
U.S. EPA, CLEAN WATER ACT SECTION 401 WATER QUALITY
CERTIFICATION: A WATER QUALITY PROTECTION TOOL FOR STATES
AND TRIBES (2010).
U.S. EPA, NPDES PERMIT WRITERS’ MANUAL § 5.2.3.2 (Sept.
2010).
C. SUMMARY OF FACTS.
On January 18, 2017, EPA Region XII issued a federal
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES)
permit to EnerProg, L.L.C., pursuant to section 402 of the Clean
Water Act (CWA). 33 U.S.C. § 1342. The permit authorizes
EnerProg to continue water pollution discharges associated with
the continued operation of the Moutard Electric Generating
Station (MEGS), a coal-fired steam electric power plant located in
Fossil, Progress.
The underlying factual background for the permit renewal at
issue is adequately stated in the following excerpts from the Fact
Sheet for the permit:2
2. Although this factual summary contains all pertinent facts and procedure
as developed by the opinion of the Environmental Appeals Board, it is condensed.
Judges and brief graders should also review the Problem.
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A. Summary and Background
This is a renewal for the Moutard Electric Generating Station
(MEGS). The facility is a coal-fired electric generating plant with
one unit rated at a maximum dependable capacity of 745
megawatts (MW). Water for plant uses is withdrawn from the
Moutard Reservoir as required to make up for evaporative losses
from the cooling tower, boiler water, ash transport water, and
drinking water needs. This facility is subject to EPA effluent
limitation guidelines per 40 C.F.R. section 423 - Steam Electric
Power Generating Point Source Category. The facility has a closedcycle cooling system (cooling tower), with an actual intake flow and
design intake flow of less than 125 million gallons per day (MGD).
The facility has a wet fly ash handling system and a wet bottom
ash handling system, which use water to sluice ash solids through
pipes to one ash pond, where the transport water undergoes
treatment by sedimentation before it is discharged to the Moutard
Reservoir. The ash pond was created in June, 1978 by damming
the then free-flowing upper reach of Fossil Creek. Fossil Creek
does not discharge to the Moutard Reservoir, but is a perennial
tributary to the Progress River, a navigable-in-fact interstate body
of water.
The facility operates the following outfalls:
Outfall 001. Cooling Tower System. Less than once per year
the cooling towers and circulating water system are drained by
gravity and discharged directly to Moutard Reservoir.
Outfall 002. Ash Pond Treatment System. Outfall 002
discharges directly to Moutard Reservoir via a riser structure. The
ash pond receives ash transport water containing bottom ash and
fly ash, coal pile runoff, stormwater runoff, cooling tower
blowdown, flue gas desulfurization (FGD) wastewater, and various
low volume wastes such as boiler blowdown, oily waste treatment,
wastes/backwash from the water treatment processes including
Reverse-Osmosis (RO) wastewater, plant area wash down water,
landfill leachate, monofill leachate, equipment heat exchanger

This summary includes background information that was not included in the
Problem, but is necessary for the teams to develop independently. These facts are
indicated as such, see sections I(C)(3), (4) infra.
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water, groundwater, yard sump overflows, occasional piping
leakage from limestone slurry and the FGD system, and treated
domestic wastewater.
Internal Outfall 008. Fly ash and bottom ash transport water
system, and cooling tower blowdown. Cooling tower blowdown is
mixed with ash sluice water prior to discharging into the ash pond.
These waste streams and ash transport water are directly
discharged to the ash pond. Cooling tower blowdown is usually
indirectly discharged to Moutard Reservoir via the ash pond
treatment system (Outfall 002). Ash transport flows will be
eliminated from this outfall upon completion of conversion to dry
ash transport handling, whereby fly ash and bottom ash will be
disposed of into a dry landfill.
Internal Outfall 009. Discharge from the FGD blowdown
treatment system to the ash pond. FGD blowdown is indirectly
discharged to Moutard Reservoir via the ash pond treatment
system (Outfall 002).
Outfall 002A. Upon completion of construction, discharge from
the new lined retention basin. The flows from the ash pond will be
re-directed to the retention basin when the construction of the
retention basin is completed. At that point, the ash pond will no
longer accept any wastewater. Retention basin will accept wastes
from the holding cell (vacuumed sediments and solids), monofill
leachate (coal ash), coal pile runoff, stormwater runoff, cooling
tower blowdown, FGD wastewater, and various low volume wastes
such as boiler blowdown, oily waste treatment, wastes/backwash
from the water treatment processes including Reverse-Osmosis
(RO) wastewater, plant area wash down water, landfill leachate,
equipment heat exchanger water, groundwater, occasional piping
leakage from limestone slurry and FGD system, chemical metal
cleaning waste, and treated domestic wastewater. The wastewater
from this outfall discharges to Moutard Reservoir via Outfall 002.
B. Permit Limits and Conditions Development
The State of Progress has issued a certification pursuant to
section 401 of the Clean Water Act for the renewal of the MEGS
NPDES permit. One of the conditions of the Progress Section 401
certification is that, in order to comply with the Progress Coal Ash
Cleanup Act (CACA), EnerProg must cease operation of its ash
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pond by November 1, 2018, complete dewatering of its ash pond by
September 1, 2019, and cover the dewatered ash pond with an
impermeable cap by September 1, 2020. CACA is a state-enacted
law requiring assessment, closure, and remediation of substandard
coal ash disposal facilities in the State of Progress. The CACA
legislation recites that its purpose is to prevent public hazards
associated with the failures of ash treatment pond containment
systems, as well as leaks from these treatment ponds into ground
and surface waters. Pursuant to Clean Water Act section 401(d),
these Progress requirements are incorporated as additional
conditions to the permit.
Pursuant to the 2015 revised Effluent Limitation Guidelines
for the Steam Electric Power Generating Point Source Category,
40 C.F.R. part 423, Best Available Technology (BAT) for toxic
discharges associated with bottom ash and fly ash is zero
discharge, based on the available technology of dry handling of
these wastes. Based on the requirements of the Progress 401
certification, it is determined that MEGS is capable of meeting this
zero discharge standard by the initial compliance deadline of
November 1, 2018. The 2015 Steam Electric Power Generating
Point Source Category ELGs are the subject of an industry
challenge that is pending in the Fifth Circuit. See subsection
I(C)(3), infra. The discharge from the MEGS coal ash pond contains
elevated levels of mercury, arsenic, and selenium, which are all
toxic pollutants.
It is determined that, independent of the 2015 ELGs, this
permit must contain limits for toxic pollutants actually present in
the discharge based on the BAT. The EPA permit writer
determined (as evident in the 2015 ELGs) that dry handling of
bottom ash and fly ash has been in use at existing plants in the
industry for many years. MEGS is sufficiently profitable to adopt
dry handling of these wastes with zero liquid discharges, with no
more than a twelve cents per month increase in the average
consumer’s electric bill. Accordingly, the permit writer has
determined, in the exercise of his best professional judgment, that
zero discharge of ash handling wastes by November 1, 2018
constitutes BAT for discharges associated with coal ash wastes.
The facility will be required to build a new Retention Basin to
reroute all waste streams that are currently discharged to the ash
pond. This change is necessary to decommission the existing ash

9
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pond and meet the requirements of CACA. The Retention Basin
will have a cell where various vacuumed sediments and solids can
be decanted prior to disposal. The Basin will also accept the
monofill leachate. The monofill contains coal ash.
The facility is also constructing a new FGD settling basin. The
waste from the basin will be treated by VCE. In the case of severe
storms, overflow from the basin may be routed to Outfall 002.
Appropriate TBEL limits are applied to Outfall 002 to
accommodate such overflows.
The final permit contained the following conditions relevant to
this appeal:
I.

By November 1, 2018 there shall be no discharge of
pollutants in fly ash transport water. This requirement only
applies to fly ash transport water generated after
November 1, 2018.

II.

By November 1, 2018 there shall be no discharge of
pollutants in bottom ash transport water. This requirement
only applies to bottom ash transport water generated after
November 1, 2018.
Special Condition A:
EnerProg must cease operation of its ash pond by November
1, 2018, complete dewatering of its ash pond by September
1, 2019, and cover the dewatered ash pond with an
impermeable cap by September 1, 2020.

In addition, the final permit authorized the continued use of
internal outfall 008 to transport bottom and fly ash to the coal ash
pond without any effluent limits on an interim basis until closure
of the coal ash treatment pond on November 1, 2018.
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C. 2015 ELG Suspension
The following factual summary was not included in the Problem,
but teams were expected to research and understand this
background for the purposes of this case:3
The EPA issued Final Effluent Limitations Guidelines (ELGs)
in 2015 for the Steam Electric Power Generating Point Source
Category. Effluent Limitations Guidelines and Standards for the
Steam Electric Power Generating Point Source Category, 80 Fed.
Reg. 67838-01 (Nov. 3, 2015) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 423). These
ELGs included zero-discharge requirements for coal ash transport
water. Id. The effective date of the 2015 ELGs was January 4,
2016; the compliance date is November 1, 2018. Id. at 67838,
67882. In 2015, petitions were filed for review of the 2015
regulations, which were consolidated in the Fifth Circuit in
December, 2015. See Consolidation Order, In re: EPA, Effluent
Limitation Guidelines, MCP No. 136, ECF Doc. 3 (J.P.M.L. Dec. 8,
2015); Consolidation Order, Sw. Elec. Power Co. v. EPA, No. 1560821, ECF Doc. 00513301255 (5th Cir. Dec. 9, 2015).
In March and April 2017, two petitions for administrative
reconsideration were filed.4 On April 11, 2017, EPA Administrator
Scott Pruitt sent a letter to Virginia Governor, and Chair of the
National Governors’ Association, Terry McAuliffe notifying him of
the flexibility provided to the state in the application of the new
effluent limitations. Letter from EPA Administrator Scott Pruitt
to Virginia Governor Terry McAuliffe (Apr. 11, 2017). On April 12,
2017, Pruitt sent a letter to the March/April 2017 petitioners
announcing the agency’s decision to: 1) postpone the November 1,
2018 compliance deadlines; 2) reconsider the 2015 ELGs rule; 3)
file a motion requesting the Fifth Circuit to hold the litigation
challenging the Rule in abeyance during reconsideration; and 4)
conduct notice and comment rulemaking. Id. The Notice cites
section 705 of the APA as legal authority for this action. Letter
from EPA Administrator Scott Pruitt to Petitioners Hunton &
3. See Appendix III for this factual background set forth in a timeline.
4. See U.S. EPA, Steam Electric Power Generating Effluent Guidelines –
Petitions for Reconsideration, https://www.epa.gov/eg/steam-electric-powergenerating-effluent-guidelines-petitions-reconsideration (last visited Nov. 27,
2017).
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Williams, L.L.P., and U.S. Small Business Administration (Apr.
12, 2017). See 5 U.S.C. § 705.
On April 25, 2017, the notice given by letter to petitioners was
detailed in the Federal Register (“the Notice”). Postponement of
Certain Compliance Dates for Effluent Limitations Guidelines and
Standards for the Steam Electric Power Generating Point Source
Category, 82 Fed. Reg. 19005 (Apr. 25, 2017). The Notice reads:
“. . . after considering the objections raised in the reconsideration
petitions, the Administrator determined that it is appropriate and
in the public interest to reconsider the Rule. Under Section 705 of
the APA . . . , and when justice so requires, an Agency may
postpose the effective date of action taken by it pending judicial
review.” Id. at 19005. The Notice states that the November 1, 2018
compliance dates have not yet passed and “are within the meaning
of the term ‘effective date’ as that term is used in Section 705 of the
APA.” Id. The Notice cites the capital expenditures required by
facilities in order to meet the new standards. Id. The Notice also
states: “This will preserve the regulatory status quo with respect
to wastestreams subject to the Rule’s new, and more stringent,
limitations and standards, while the litigation is pending and the
reconsideration is underway.” Id.
On April 14, 2017, prior to the Notice, the EPA requested that
the Fifth Circuit hold the consolidated case in abeyance while the
Agency reconsiders the Rule. On April 24, 2017, the Fifth Circuit
granted the motion and placed the case in abeyance. On June 6,
2017, the EPA published notice of the proposed rule to postpone
deadlines. Postponement of Certain Compliance Dates for the
Effluent Limitations Guidelines and Standards for the Steam
Electric Power Generating Point Source Category, 82 Fed. Reg.
26017-01 (June 6, 2017). The EPA explained: “Because Section 705
of the APA authorizes an Agency to postpone the effective date of
an action pending judicial review, EPA is undertaking this noticeand-comment rulemaking to postpone certain compliance dates in
the rule in the event that the litigation ends.” Id. at 26018. On
August 11, 2017, the EPA sent a letter to the petitioners stating
their intention to conduct rulemaking to revise the ELGs. Letter
from EPA Administrator Scott Pruitt to Petitioners Hunton &
Williams, L.L.P., and U.S. Small Business Administration (Aug.
11, 2017).
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There has been development on this issue following the
September 1, 2017 cut-off date established for the purposes of this
competition. Teams have been instructed to not cite any decisions or
documents dated after September 1, 2017 in briefs or in oral
argument.
D. WOTUS Exception Suspension
The following factual summary was not included in the
Problem, but teams were expected to research and understand this
background for the purposes of this case:5
40 C.F.R. section 122.2 defines “waters of the United States”
to include “all impoundments of waters otherwise identified as
waters of the United States.” 40 C.F.R. § 122.2. Subsection 2 of this
definition specifically excludes “waste treatment systems,
including ponds or lagoons designed to meet the requirements of
the Clean Water Act.” Id. However, there is an exception to this
exclusion: “This exclusion applies only to manmade bodies of water
which neither were originally created in waters of the United
States (such as disposal area in wetlands) nor resulted from the
impoundment of waters of the United States.” Id. (emphasis added).
To further complicate this back-and-forth, Note 1 to this
section explains: “At 45 FR 48620, July 21, 1980, the
Environmental Protection Agency suspended until further notice
in § 122.2, the last sentence beginning ‘This exclusion applies ___’
in the definition of ‘Waters of the United States.’ Th[e 1983]
revision continues that suspension.” Id. n.1. See Consolidated
Permit Regulations, 45 Fed. Reg. 48620-01 (July 21, 1980). The
suspension was in response to petitions for review from industry
groups and one environmental group. 45 Fed. Reg. at 48620.
Industry objections included concerns “that the language of the
regulation would require them to obtain permits for discharges
into existing waste treatment systems . . . which had been in
existence for many years. In many cases, [industry groups] argued,
EPA has issued permits for discharges from, not into, these
systems.” Id. The EPA suspended this exception after determining
“that the regulation should be carefully re-examined and that it
5. See Appendix IV for this factual background set forth in a graphic.
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may be overly broad.” Id. The EPA cited their intention to
“promptly . . . develop a revised definition and to publish it as a
proposed rule for public comment. At the conclusion of that
rulemaking, EPA will amend the rule or terminate the
suspension.” Id. (emphasis added).
In sum, as a result of this suspension (of the exception to the
exclusion), waste treatment systems, including ponds or lagoons
designed to meet the requirements of the CWA, including those
that resulted from the impoundment of waters of the United States
do not fall under the definition of waters of the United States.
Despite the EPA’s stated intent, rulemaking was never conducted
– and the suspension remained in place.
However, the 2015 Clean Water Rule “[l]ift[ed] the suspension
of the last sentence of the definition.”6 Clean Water Rule:
Definition of “Waters of the United States”; Final Rule, 80 Fed.
Reg. 37054, 37114 (June 29, 2015). The Rule then asserts to, again,
“suspend[] the last sentence of the definition,” id., likely as a
measure to properly employ notice and comment rulemaking for
this suspension. In effect, the 2015 Clean Water Rule retains the
suspension. Of course, the 2015 Clean Water Rule was stayed by
the Sixth Circuit, thus the 1983 revisions currently apply.7 In re
EPA, 803 F.3d 804 (6th Cir. 2015).

6. This sentence is the suspension made in 45 Fed. Reg. 48620 (July 21,
1980), discussed above.
7. On February 28, 2017, President Trump, by executive order, ordered the
review of the 2015 Clean Water Rule, in light of a declaration of policy that reads:
“It is in the national interest that the Nation’s navigable waters are kept free from
pollution, while at the same time promoting economic growth, minimizing
regulatory uncertainty, and showing due regard for the roles of the Congress and
the States under the Constitution.” Exec. Order No. 13778, 82 Fed. Reg. 12497
(Feb. 28, 2017). On July 27, 2017, EPA and the Army Corps of Engineers
published a proposed rule to rescind the 2015 Clean Water Rule and recodify the
prior regulations. Definition of “Waters of the United States” – Recodification of
Pre-Existing Rules, 82 Fed. Reg. 34899 (July 27, 2017). The agencies would then
re-evaluate the definition. Id. Public comment for the proposed rule closed on
September 27, 2017, after an extension. Definition of “Waters of the United
States” – Recodification of Pre-Existing Rules; Extension of Comment Period, 82
Fed. Reg. 39712 (Aug. 22, 2017).
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PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On April 1, 2017, after being granted an extension by the
Environmental Appeals Board, both EnerProg and Fossil Creek
Watchers, Inc. (FCW), filed timely petitions for review in front of
the EAB of the NPDES permit pursuant to 40 C.F.R. part 124,
requesting on a number of grounds that the permit be remanded
to Region XII for further consideration. Both parties filed
supplement briefing on the issue of the April 25, 2017 Notice
suspending the compliance date of the 2015 ELGs. EnerProg and
FCW both properly preserved their respective claims by filing
comments on the draft permit.
EnerProg challenged the inclusion in the final permit of a
condition in the Clean Water Act Section 401 Certification issued
by the State of Progress requiring EnerProg to terminate its use of
the coal ash settling pond at MEGS by November 1, 2018, dewater
the ash pond by September 1, 2019, and cap the remaining coal
combustion residuals by September 1, 2020. EnerProg challenged
the inclusion of the zero discharge requirements for coal ash
transport waters from the 2015 revised Effluent Limitation
Guidelines (ELGs) for the Steam Electric Power Generating Point
Source Category, despite the Notice issued by EPA Administrator
Scott Pruitt on April 25, 2017 suspending the compliance date for
these ELGs. EnerProg also challenged the permit writer’s reliance
on Best Professional Judgment as an alternative ground for
requiring MEGS to implement dry handling of bottom and fly ash
wastes in order to achieve zero discharge of toxic pollutants
associated with these wastes by November 1, 2018.
FCW challenged the ash pond closure and capping provisions,
on the grounds that these requirements are unlawful unless a
section 404 permit is obtained. In addition, FCW contended that
the permit illegally authorizes discharges of bottom ash and fly ash
pollutants into the coal ash pond without subjecting the discharges
to CWA effluent limitations, because the MEGS ash pond itself is
a water of the United States.
During the Spring Term, 2017, the EAB issued their decision
to deny both petitions for review. The EAB rejected EnerProg’s
objections to the inclusion of the ash pond closure and capping
conditions because they are sufficiently related to surface water
quality and, therefore, fall within the scope of section 401(d). The
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EAB found the EPA’s reliance on BPJ as an alternative ground for
the zero discharge requirement for ash transport and treatment
wastes to be justified because the 1982 ELGs did not regulate the
toxic pollutants within these wastes, rejecting EnerProg’s claim.
The EAB denied EnerProg’s claim that the inclusion of the 2015
ELG compliance deadlines was inappropriate given the April 25,
2017 Notice of their suspension, therefore also denying the party’s
request for modification. EAB found that this suspension was
ineffective because section 705 of the APA does not authorize the
postponement of compliance dates, therefore notice and comment
rulemaking was required for such a suspension.
The EAB also rejected both of FCW’s claims. The EAB found
that the suspension of a provision that included the coal ash pond
as a water of the United States was effective, and therefore Outfall
008 into the coal ash pond was internal. Therefore, this discharge
does not require a section 402 permit. The EAB also found that a
section 404 permit is not required for the closure and capping of
the coal ash pond.
EnerProg and FCW both filed timely petitions pursuant to
section 509(b) of the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b),8
seeking judicial review of the final decision of the EAB, affirming
the issuance of the Final NPDES Permit to EnerProg.
The Court has determined that both petitioners have standing
to pursue their petitions for review, that jurisdiction properly lies
in this court pursuant to 33 U.S.C. section 1369(b), and that all
issues raised in the petitions were properly preserved for appeal.

8. “Review of the Administrator’s action . . . may be had by any interested
person in the Circuit Court of Appeals.” 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1).
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ISSUES
I.

Whether the Final Permit properly included conditions
requiring closure and remediation of the coal ash pond as
provided by the State of Progress in the CWA section 401
certification, including the questions:
a. Whether EPA was required to include all such
Progress certification conditions without regard to
their consistency with CWA section 401(d); and
b. Assuming the question of the consistency of the
conditions with CWA section 401(d) is open to the
EPA and to this reviewing court, whether the ash
pond closure and remediation conditions constitute
“appropriate requirements of State law” as required
by CWA section 401(d).

On appeal, EnerProg will argue that EPA must review the
permissibility of the conditions and the closure conditions are not
appropriate.
On appeal, EPA will argue that it does have jurisdiction to
consider the permissibility of conditions, but that these conditions
are appropriate.
On appeal, FCW will argue that EPA has no jurisdiction to
determine the appropriateness of the conditions of State CWA
section 401 certifications, and that while these conditions are
“appropriate requirements of State law,” they independently
violate the requirement for a CWA section 404 permit.
II.

Whether the April 25, 2017 EPA Notice suspending certain
future compliance deadlines for the 2015 Final Effluent
Limitation Guidelines for the Steam Electric Power
Generating Industry is effective to require the suspension
of the permit compliance deadlines for achieving zero
discharge of coal ash transport water.

On appeal, EnerProg and EPA will argue that the April 25,
2017 Notice is effective to require suspension of the compliance
deadlines, and their inclusion in the NPDES permit was improper.
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On appeal, FCW will argue that the April 25, 2017 Notice is
ineffective in requiring suspension of the compliance deadlines,
and their inclusion in the NPDES permit was proper.
III.

Whether EPA Region XII could rely on Best Professional
Judgment as an alternative ground to require zero
discharge of coal ash transport wastes, independent of the
applicability or effectiveness of the 2015 Steam Electric
Power Generating Industry Effluent Limitation Guidelines.

On appeal, EnerProg will argue that EPA could not rely on
Best Professional Judgment.
On appeal, EPA and FCW will argue that the agency could
rely on Best Professional Judgment as an alternative ground for
requiring zero discharge of coal ash transport wastes.
IV.

Whether NPDES permitting requirements apply to
EnerProg’s pollutant discharges into the MEGS ash pond,
in light of EPA’s July 21, 1980 suspension of the provision
of 40 C.F.R. section 122.2 that originally included waste
treatment systems formed by impounding pre-existing
waters of the United States within the regulatory definition
of waters of the United States.

On appeal, EnerProg and EPA will argue that the discharges
into the ash pond are not subject to effluent limits because this
suspension was effective.
On appeal, FCW will argue that the discharges into the ash
pond are subject to effluent limits because this suspension was
ineffective and the other requirements are met.
V.

Whether the ash pond closure and capping plan requires a
permit for the discharge of fill material pursuant to section
404 of the CWA.
On appeal, EnerProg and EPA will argue that it does not.
On appeal, FCW will argue that it does.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
Administrative exhaustion requires that the final NPDES
permit first be reviewed by the Environmental Appeals Board. 40
C.F.R. § 124.19(l)(2); 5 U.S.C. § 704. Petitions must be filed within
thirty days after the issuance of the final NPDES permit,9 and
“[a]ny person who filed comments on the draft permit . . . may file
a petition for review.” 40 C.F.R. § 124.19(a)(2), (3). The final
decision of the EAB is reviewable by the appropriate Circuit Court
of Appeals. 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1). Petitions for judicial review
must be filed within 120 days of the final agency action challenged.
Id.
In this proceeding, the Twelfth Circuit is reviewing the EAB’s
denial of petitions to review a final NPDES permit. Under the
Administrative Procedure Act, a federal court will review the
EAB’s decision to determine whether it was “arbitrary, capricious,
an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5
U.S.C. § 706 (2)(A). See City of Pittsfield, Mass. v. U.S. EPA, 614
F.3d 7, 13-14 (1st Cir. 2010). With regard to how the court should
treat the EAB’s interpretation: “To the extent that the EAB’s
decision reflects a gloss on its interpretation of the governing EPA
regulations, a reviewing court must also afford those policy
judgments substantial deference, deferring to them unless they are
arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise ‘plainly’ impermissible.”
Pepperell Assocs. v. U.S. EPA, 246 F.3d 15, 22 (1st Cir. 2001). The
court’s review of the agency’s interpretation of the statute that
Congress has entrusted it to administer must be guided by
Chevron deference. See Chevron v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 843
(1984) (holding that where the statute is either “silent or
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the
court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute”). “[A] reviewing court must generally
be at its most deferential” when the agency is “making predictions,
within its area of special expertise, at the frontiers of
science.” Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. NRDC, 462 U.S. 87, 103
(1983). But see P.R. Sun Oil Co. v. U.S. EPA, 8 F.3d 73, 77 (1st Cir.
1993) (“But in the end an agency decision must also be rational –
technically speaking, it must not be ‘arbitrary or capricious,’ . . .
9. The EAB granted both parties an extension of this 30-day deadline.
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and that requirement exists even in technical areas of
regulation.”).
The Supreme Court set forth a four-part test to determine if a
decision was arbitrary or capricious: “[I]f the agency has relied on
factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely
failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an
explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before
the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a
difference in view or the product of agency expertise.” Motor
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).

ARGUMENTS
I.

SECTION 401 CERTIFICATION: Did the Final
Permit properly include conditions requiring closure
and remediation of the coal ash pond as provided by
the State of Progress in the section 401 certification?

In front of the Environmental Appeals Board, EnerProg
argued that the inclusion of the ash pond closure and capping
conditions10 as permit requirements was in violation of section
401(d) of the Clean Water Act because the conditions are not
“appropriate requirements of State law.” EnerProg argued that
these CACA conditions are not based on achieving State water
quality standards, nor are they related to achieving effluent
limitations. EnerProg also argued that the EAB has the authority
to review these conditions because there is no procedure available
under the Laws of Progress for it to obtain judicial review of the
conditions included in the section 401 certification. The EAB
rejected both arguments.
EnerProg and EPA can make a strong argument that the EAB
had the authority to review the section 401 certification conditions
because no available channels for state review are available. EPA
and FCW will be able to make a persuasive argument that the EAB
was not arbitrary or capricious in determining that the section 401
10. Note: In conjunction with the closure and capping of the coal ash pond,
this waste stream will subsequently be subject to dry ash transport handling,
whereby fly ash and bottom ash will be disposed of into a dry landfill. R. at 8.
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conditions were “appropriate requirements of state law” under a
commonly accepted broad reading of this phrase. EnerProg will
have to rely on a strict reading of the phrase.
II.

REVIEWING AUTHORITY: Was the EPA required to
include all such Progress certification conditions?

Generally, the conditions included in a section 401 state
certification are not reviewable by federal courts or administrative
proceedings. The NPDES implementing regulations read: “Review
and appeals of limitations and conditions attributable to State
certification shall be made through the applicable procedures of
the State and may not be made through the procedures in this
part.” 40 C.F.R. § 124.55(e) (emphasis added).
While this issue has never been decided by the Supreme Court,
circuit courts have consistently held that in order to challenge
conditions included in a section 401 certification, the “only recourse
is to challenge the state certification in state judicial proceedings.”
Del Ackels v. U.S. EPA, 7 F.3d 862, 867 (9th Cir. 1993). See also
Am. Rivers Inc. v. FERC, 129 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 1997); United
States v. Marathon Dev. Corp., 867 F.2d 96, 102 (1st Cir. 1989);
Roosevelt Campobello Int’l Park Comm’n v. U.S. EPA, 684 F.2d
1041, 1056 (1st Cir. 1982). The First Circuit further reasoned that
the authority to review these conditions is limited “because a state
law determination is involved.” Marathon Dev. Corp., 867 F.2d at
102.
In American Rivers, the Second Circuit looked to the language
of section 401(d) which reads, “[a]ny certification provided under
this section . . . shall become a condition on any Federal license or
permit subject to the provisions of this section.” 33 U.S.C. § 1341(d)
(emphasis added); Am. Rivers, Inc., 129 F.3d at 107. The court
found the “language [of section 401(d) to be] unequivocal, leaving
little room for [the federal agency] to argue that it has authority to
reject state conditions it finds to be ultra vires.” Am. Rivers, Inc.,
129 F.3d at 107. Rather, “[w]hile the [federal agency] may
determine whether the proper state has issued the certification or
whether a state has issued a certification within the prescribed
period, the [federal agency] does not possess a roving mandate to
decide that substantive aspects of state-imposed conditions are
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inconsistent with the terms of § 401.” Id. at 110-11. This is the
reasoning followed in the EAB decision. R. at 11.
Agency guidance documents also reflect this interpretation. In
the 2010 Clean Water Act Section 401 Water Quality Certification
Handbook, the EPA distinguishes the scope of review of state
versus federal courts or administrative proceedings, where federal
courts or agencies solely have the authority to review procedural
requirements. U.S. EPA, CLEAN WATER ACT SECTION 401 WATER
QUALITY CERTIFICATION: A WATER QUALITY PROTECTION TOOL
FOR STATES AND TRIBES 31 (2010) [hereinafter CWA SECTION 401
HANDBOOK]. See also EPA, Decision of the General Counsel No.
58 (Mar. 29, 1977).
EnerProg and EPA will rely on the special circumstances
rule established by the Fourth Circuit that allows for federal
judicial or administrative review. In Consolidation Coal Company,
Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency, the court found that the
permit recipient had “no available channels of State review, either
administratively or judicially.” 537 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1976).
Therefore, “due process requires that” the permittee be granted an
administrative proceeding in front of the EPA. Id. See U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV. Here, as EnerProg argued in front of the EAB, a fact
uncontested by FCW, “there is no procedure available under the
Laws of Progress for it to obtain judicial review of its challenge to
the conditions established in the Progress CWA section 401
certification, as Progress law does not provide for review of such
certifications in the state’s courts.” R. at 10-11. Therefore, the only
available avenue is a federal administrative or judicial proceeding.
These parties will conclude that the EAB “entirely failed to
consider an important aspect of the problem,” Motor Vehicle Mfrs.
Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 43, by not considering the lack of a state channel
for review, and therefore their determination was arbitrary and
capricious.
FCW will argue that the Fourth Circuit decision in
Consolidation Coal is not binding on the Twelfth Circuit, and that
the prevailing view is that the EPA is not authorized to review the
section 401 certification conditions. FCW will also note that the
Seventh Circuit specifically declined to follow the reasoning of
Consolidation Coal. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 836
(7th Cir. 1977) (overruled on other grounds by W. Chi., Ill. v. U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 701 F.2d 632, 644 (7th Cir. 1983)).
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EnerProg and EPA might also choose to make the due
process argument from scratch, rather than rely on Consolidation
Coal. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. FCW would respond that,
regardless, the proper remedy to ensure due process is to review
the section 401 conditions in state court or administrative
proceeding, not before the EPA or the Twelfth Circuit.
III.

APPROPRIATE REQUIREMENTS: Were the ash
pond
closure
and
remediation
conditions
“appropriate requirement[s] of State law” as
required by CWA section 401(d)?

Section 401(d) allows for certification conditions to include
conditions “to assure that any applicant for a Federal . . . permit
will comply with any applicable effluent limitations and other
limitations, under section 1311 or 1312 of this title, . . . and with
any other appropriate requirement of State law.” 33 U.S.C.
§ 1341(d). See also 40 C.F.R. § 121.2(a)(4) (State certification shall
include, “[a] statement of any conditions which the certifying
agency deems necessary or desirable with respect to the discharge
of the activity.”). The EAB found that the ash pond remediation
was sufficiently related to surface water quality as to fall within
the scope of section 401(d), relying on the Supreme Court’s decision
in PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Washington Department of
Ecology, 511 U.S. 700 (1994). See R. at 11.
In PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County,11 the Supreme Court
adopted a broad reading of section 401(d). 511 U.S. 700 (1994).
First, the Court held that section 401 state certification conditions
do not need to be related to the specific discharges for which the
permit is sought, rather “401(d) is most reasonably read as
authorizing additional conditions and limitations on the activity as
a whole once the threshold condition, the existence of a discharge,
is satisfied.” Id. at 711. Second, the Court held that conditions
“imposed pursuant to state water quality standards” are
11. In PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County, the section 401 certification condition
at issue was the requirement of maintaining minimum stream flow in order to
support spawning salmon. 511 U.S. at 714-15. This condition was held to be
appropriate as “a proper application of state and federal antidegradation
regulations, as it ensures that an ‘existing instream water us[e]’ will be
‘maintained and protected.’” Id. at 719.
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appropriate requirements of state law, but refused to speculate as
to what other conditions would satisfy this standard. Id. at 713.
The Court further noted that water quality standards “consist of
the designated uses of the navigable waters involved and the water
quality criteria for such waters based upon such uses.” Id. at 714
(quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(A)) (emphasis in original).
EnerProg will argue that the ash pond closure and capping
conditions are not related to water quality standards, and are
therefore inappropriate section 401 certification conditions. CACA
does not refer to any specific standards that could be considered
“water quality standards.” Similar to the Supreme Court’s holding
in PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County, the Clean Water Act Section 401
Water Quality Certification Handbook explains that “[w]ater
quality standards consist of designated uses, criteria (narrative
and numeric), and an antidegradation policy, which together
provide environmental benchmarks for each class of water body.”
U.S. EPA, CLEAN WATER ACT SECTION 401 WATER QUALITY
CERTIFICATION: A WATER QUALITY PROTECTION TOOL FOR STATES
AND TRIBES 19 (2010). The party will argue that the conditions are
not sufficiently linked to water quality standards, or that the State
of Progress has not clearly articulated their relation to these
standards, such that their inclusion as conditions was arbitrary
and capricious.
FCW and EPA will advocate for a broader reading of section
401(d). A broad reading is supported by the implementing
regulation for section 401 which states that the certification may
include any condition “desirable” with respect to the activity. 40
C.F.R. § 121.2(a)(4). See also Power Auth. of State of N.Y. v. Dep’t
of Envtl. Conservation of State of N.Y., 379 F. Supp. 243, 249 (N.D.
N.Y. 1974) (“[T]he Congressional intent is clear that the states
retain the right to set more restrictive standards than those
imposed by the Act.”). Several courts have taken expansive
readings of what conditions are permitted, including those related
to water quality generally. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth v. U.S.
Navy, 841 F.2d 927, 929 (9th Cir. 1988) (concluding that a state
“mixed” land use and environmental regulation was an
appropriate basis for a section 401 condition); Arnold Irrigation
Dist. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 717 P.2d 1274, 1279 (Or. Ct. App.
1986) (concluding that section 401(d) permits all conditions
necessary to meet “all water quality-related statutes and rules,”
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including land use regulations). See also Debra L. Donahue, The
Untapped Power of Clean Water Act Section 401, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q.
201, 254 (1996) (“[W]hile the limits of the term “any other
appropriate requirement of State law” have yet to be defined, a
broad interpretation, not confined to state water quality standards
approved by EPA per CWA section 303, seems justified.”). The
Clean Water Act Section 401 Water Quality Certification Handbook
also explains: “Under CWA § 401(d) the water quality concerns to
consider, and the range of potential conditions available to address
those concerns, extends to any provision of state or tribal law
relating to the aquatic resource. Considerations can be quite broad
so long as they relate to water quality.” CWA SECTION 401
HANDBOOK at 23 (emphasis added). Therefore, even where there
are no water quality standards to apply, or if they were not
considered, so long as the condition relates to water quality, it is
appropriate under section 401(d).
Here, the section 401 conditions stemmed from the Progress
Coal Ash Cleanup Act (CACA), a law whose purpose is “to prevent
public hazards associated with the failures of ash treatment pond
containment systems, as well as leaks from these treatment ponds
into ground and surface waters.” R. at 8-9. The law is directly
related to preserving water quality. Furthermore, the capping and
closure conditions can also be considered to directly relate to the
purpose of the Clean Water Act in that they aim to prevent the
discharge of pollutants from the closed ash pond (pollutants that
might otherwise be subject to section 301 and 402 if discharged
from the pond). Furthermore, these conditions are standard
requirements for the closure of coal ash ponds. See, e.g., Hazardous
and Solid Waste Management System; Disposal of Coal
Combustion Residuals From Electric Utilities; Final Rule, 80 Fed.
Reg. 21302 (Apr. 17, 2015).
EnerProg might note the underlying reasoning for urging the
court to not include the ash pond closure requirements as
conditions on the NPDES permit. If these conditions are included,
EnerProg’s compliance, or lack thereof, is subject to the citizen suit
provision of the CWA. 33 U.S.C. § 1365. If these requirements
remain solely under the purview of CACA, the citizen suit
provision does not apply; rather the Progress agency would be
solely responsible for ensuring compliance.
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FCW might also note here that the section 401 ash pond
closure conditions, while appropriate requirements of state law,
independently violate the requirement for a CWA section 404
permit. See section VIII, infra.
IV.

ELG COMPLIANCE DATE: Did the April 25, 2017
EPA Notice effectively suspend permit compliance
deadlines for achieving zero discharge of coal ash
transport water?

In front of the EAB, EnerProg requested an extension of the
compliance deadline for the zero discharge requirement for coal
ash transport waters from the 2015 Final ELGs for the Steam
Electric Power Generating Point Source Category, consistent with
the Notice issued by EPA Administrator Scott Pruitt on April 25,
2017 suspending the compliance date for these ELGs. The EAB
found that EnerProg had not demonstrated that the November 1,
2018 deadline in the permit was infeasible. Furthermore, the EAB
found that section 705 of the APA only authorizes the suspension
of effective dates, not compliance dates, as the one at issue here.
Instead, the EAB concluded that the EPA must conduct notice and
comment rulemaking in order to suspend the compliance date.
EnerProg and EPA will argue on appeal that the EAB’s
refusal to extend the compliance date, despite its suspension by the
EPA, was arbitrary and capricious because the use of section 705 to
suspend the compliance date was proper, adequately justified, and,
regardless, notice and comment rulemaking was not required for
the suspension as it was not substantive rulemaking. FCW has the
stronger argument here. The EAB’s denial of EnerProg’s claim was
not arbitrary or capricious because the section 705 suspension was
not proper, nor was it justified, and notice and comment
rulemaking was required for such a suspension.
EnerProg and EPA might first argue that 40 C.F.R. section
122.62 authorizes the modification of an existing permit when:
[t]he standards or regulations on which the permit was based have been
changed by promulgation of amended standards or regulations . . . after
the permit was issued. Permits may be modified during their terms for
this cause only as follows:
(i) For promulgation of amended standards or regulations, when:
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(A) The permit condition requested to be modified was based on a
promulgated effluent limitation guideline . . . ; and
(B) EPA has revised, withdrawn, or modified that portion of the
regulation or effluent limitation guideline on which the permit condition
was based . . . ; and
(C) A permittee requests modification in accordance with § 124.5
within ninety (90) days after Federal Register notice of the action on
which the request is based.

40 C.F.R. § 122.62(a)(3). Here, relying on a successful argument
that the 2015 ELGs were properly revised, according to the parties’
arguments outlined below, EnerProg and EPA would argue that
EnerProg properly requested modification through the EAB
petition. FCW would argue that, for the reasons outlined below, a
proper basis for the permit modification cannot be established
because the revision to the 2015 ELGs was improper. FCW would
also argue that EnerProg did not follow the proper procedure in
requesting this permit modification. 40 C.F.R. section 124.5
requires that a request for modification must be submitted to the
Region XII Administrator and “shall be in writing and shall
contain facts or reasons supporting the request.” 40 C.F.R.
§ 124.5(a). Instead, EnerProg sought a modification through the
EAB proceeding already in progress.
V.

INVOCATION OF SECTION 705: Was the invocation
of section 705 to suspend the compliance date proper?

EnerProg and EPA will argue that this suspension was an
effective invocation of section 705 of the APA, and that notice and
comment rulemaking was not required prior to issuing the Notice.
As the Notice states, the compliance date is “within the meaning
of the term ‘effective date’ as that term is used in Section 705 of the
APA.” 82 Fed. Reg. at 19005. The term effective date is not defined
in this chapter. 5 U.S.C. ch. 7. See 5 U.S.C. § 701. The parties might
argue that the agency should be granted Chevron deference with
regards to this interpretation. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
EnerProg and EPA might also argue that considering the
purpose of section 705, to maintain the status quo while pending
litigation is resolved, the court must find a broad reading of section
705 that includes compliance dates. Since the compliance date is
the “date with teeth,” it is this date that must be the subject of
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section 705. However, the Northern District of California rejected
this argument, finding in a case with similar facts that, “. . . the
Rule began to require compliance when it went into effect . . . .
Thus, rather than being toothless as of the effective date and only
suddenly acquiring a set of teeth as of the . . . compliance date, in
actuality the Rule imposed compliance obligations starting on its
effective date . . . that increased over time.” Becerra v. U.S. Dep’t
of Interior, No. 17-cv-02376-EDL, 2017 WL 3891678, at *8 (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 30, 2017).
FCW will argue, in response, that section 705 of the APA does
not apply to compliance dates. The plain language of the statute
only refers to the postponement of “effective date[s].” 5 U.S.C.
§ 705. The Supreme Court has stated that courts should
“ordinarily resist reading words or elements into a statute that do
not appear on its face.” Bates v. United States, 522 U.S. 23, 29
(1997). See also Stanton Rd. Assocs. v. Lohrey Enters., 984 F.2d
1015, 1020 (9th Cir. 1993). The court should not read into section
705 the inclusion of compliance dates within its scope, despite the
arguments from EnerProg. Furthermore, since the language of
section 705 is unambiguous as to what can be postponed, the EPA’s
interpretation should not be granted Chevron deference. Chevron,
467 U.S. at 843.
Contrary to EnerProg’s argument that the meaning of
“compliance date” is within the meaning of the term “effective
date,” as the Notice itself claimed, these two terms have distinct
meanings. Becerra, 2017 WL 3891678, at *9 (citing Silverman v.
Eastrich Multiple Investor Fund, L.P., 51 F.3d 28, 31 (3d Cir. 1995)
(“The mandatory compliance date should not be misconstrued as
the effective date of the revisions.”); NRDC v. U.S. EPA, 683 F.2d
752, 762 (3d Cir. 1982)). Section 705 “permits an agency to
postpone the effective date of a not yet effective rule, pending
judicial review.” Safety-Kleen Corp. v. EPA, No. 92-1629, 1996 U.S.
App. LEXIS 2324, at *2-3 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 19, 1996). The existence
of both an effective date and a compliance date in the rule itself
seems to defy EnerProg and EPA’s argument. See 80 Fed. Reg. at
67838, 67854.
EnerProg and EPA might also argue that possible timing
constraints require a broader reading of the language in section
705. For example, the parties may argue that an agency will not be
able to invoke section 705 after a lawsuit is filed, yet before the
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effective date. This argument was raised in front of the district
court in Becerra, but was met unsympathetically given the clear
language of the statute. Becerra, 2017 WL 3891678, at *8. If these
parties raise this argument, FCW will cite to the specific timing of
this case. Here, litigation was first filed in 2015, with the cases
consolidated on December 8, 2015. The effective date of the 2015
ELGs is January 4, 2016. The Notice of the section 705 suspension
was not published until April 25, 2017, only after the transition of
administrations and the filing of petitions for administrative
reconsideration. This timeline shows that tight timing was likely
not at issue here, and therefore should not be considered as a basis
for an expanded reading of section 705.
VI.

SECTION 705 JUSTIFICATION: Was the section 705
notice
adequately
justified
(arbitrary
and
capricious)?

FCW should also argue that the April 25, 2017 Notice was
ineffective because it did not meet the additional statutory
requirements of section 705 that it be based on “pending litigation”
and that “justice so requires” postponement. In the Notice, EPA
found that justice requires the postponement “[i]n light of the
capital expenditures that facilities incurring costs under the Rule
will need to undertake in order to meet the compliance deadlines
for the new, more stringent limitations and standards in the
Rule . . . [and] the far-ranging issues contained in the
reconsideration petitions.” 82 Fed. Reg. at 19005. No other
justification is included.
A. Four-Part Preliminary Injunction Test.
FCW may argue that EPA did not meet the four-part
preliminary injunction test in issuing the postponement under
section 705, as is required given that administrative stays must
meet the same standard as stays at the judicial level. See Sierra
Club v. Jackson, 833 F. Supp. 2d 11, 30-31 (D. D.C. 2012); Affinity
Healthcare Services, Inc. v. Sebelius, 720 F. Supp. 2d 12, 15 n.4 (D.
D.C. 2010); Corning Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Fed. Home Loan Bank
Bd., 562 F. Supp. 279, 280 (E.D. Ark. 1983); Jeffrey v. Office of Pers.
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Mgmt., 28 M.S.P.R. 434, 435-36 (M.S.P.B. 1985). The standard is
as follows:
(1) the likelihood that the party seeking the stay will prevail on the
merits of the appeal; (2) the likelihood that the moving party will be
irreparably harmed absent a stay; (3) the prospect that others will be
harmed if the court grants the stay; and (4) the public interest in
granting the stay.

Cuomo v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 772 F.2d 972 (D.C. Cir.
1985). See also Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C.L. Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109,
113 (8th Cir. 1981); Blackwelder Furniture Co. of Statesville, Inc.
v. Seilig Mfg.Co., Inc., 550 F.2d 189, 193 (4th Cir. 1977). Courts
have applied these factors to evaluate administrative stays issued
under section 705. See, e.g., Ohio ex rel. Celebrezze v. Nuclear
Regulatory Comm’n, 812 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1987); Hamlin Testing
Labs., Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 337 F.2d 221 (6th Cir.
1964); Associated Sec. Corp. v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 283 F.2d 773
(10th Cir. 1960).
The EPA failed to apply the four-part preliminary injunction
test in order to establish that “justice so requires.” FCW need not
make the argument that these four-factors are not met, since EPA
entirely failed to mention or employ the test.
FCW might also note the long-standing practice of the EPA
employing this four-part test. The EAB has applied the test to a
request for a stay under section 705, In the Matter of Pub. Serv. Co.
of N.H., 1 E.A.D. 389 (EAB 1977), and the EPA has evaluated the
four factors in considering petitions for administrative stays under
the same statute. See, e.g., 76 Fed. Reg. 28318 (May 17, 2011); 76
Fed. Reg. 4780 (Jan. 26, 2011); 75 Fed. Reg. 49556 (Aug. 13, 2010);
61 Fed. Reg. 28508 (June 5, 1996). If the EPA wished to depart
from this precedent it would need to provide justification, for “[l]ike
a court, ‘[n]ormally, an agency must adhere to its precedents in
adjudicating cases before it.’” Jicarilla Apache Nation v. U.S. Dep’t
of Interior, 613 F.3d 1112, 1120 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (quoting Consol.
Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. FERC., 315 F.3d 316, 323 (D.C. Cir.
2003). The EPA did not provide any justification for departing from
its precedent of employing this test.
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B. “Pending Judicial Review”
FCW will argue that EPA’s invocation of section 705 was
further improper in that, in effect, it did not postpone the
compliance date “pending judicial review.” The Notice indicated
the agency’s intention to stay the litigation, rather than await its
resolution: “EPA will also file a motion requesting the Fifth Circuit
to hold the litigation challenging the Rule in abeyance while the
Agency reconsiders the Rule, after which it will inform the Court
of any portions of the Rule for which it seeks a remand so that it
can conduct further rulemaking.” 82 Fed. Reg. at 19005-06. This
statement itself is misleading, given that EPA moved to stay the
litigation on April 14 and the motion was granted on April 24 –
both prior to the issuance of the Notice. The purpose of section 705
is to allow pending disputes be resolved by the courts before a rule
is put into effect. By holding the cases in abeyance, the EPA
undermined the entire purpose of the suspension. See Becerra,
2017 WL 3891678, at *9. The true purpose of the April 25, 2017
Notice was not, in fact, to suspend the compliance date “pending
judicial review,” but perhaps it was used as a stopgap measure
until the reconsideration of the rule is complete.
C. Failure to Consider Important Aspect of the
Problem
FCW will also argue that the EPA “entirely failed to consider
an important aspect of the problem.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, 463
U.S. at 43. The only statement made in the April 25, 2017 Notice
that indicated the EPA’s justification was in reference to the costs
imposed upon industry to meet the new standards. The EPA did
not appear to weigh the benefits of the 2015 ELGs, which would be
foregone given the postponement of the compliance deadline. FCW
may also argue that other important aspects were not discussed in
the Notice.
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EnerProg and EPA will argue that notice and comment
rulemaking was not required. First, these parties might argue that
section 705 effectively stands in for the notice and comment
rulemaking requirement, therefore rulemaking is not required
where section 705 is invoked. Section 705 does not include any
cross reference to section 553(d) of the APA. Cf. 5 U.S.C. § 554(c)
(includes cross references to sections 556 and 557); 5 U.S.C.
§ 556(a) (includes cross references to sections 553 and 554).
However, FCW will note, this argument was found to be
unpersuasive in Becerra by the Northern District of California.
Becerra, 2017 WL 3891678, at *10. The D.C. Circuit has held that
section 705 “does not permit the agency to suspend without notice
and comment a promulgated rule.” Safety-Kleen Corp., 1996 U.S.
App. LEXIS 2324, at *2-3. Second, EnerProg and EPA might
argue that requiring notice and comment rulemaking could
undermine the purpose of section 705 because of the time
necessary to complete the process, during which litigation would
resume. FCW would respond by noting the other mechanisms to
temporarily suspend litigation, such as a motion for abeyance,
which could be employed during the notice and comment
rulemaking process.
Generally, rulemaking includes the amendment or repeal of a
rule. 5 U.S.C. § 551(5) (“‘Rule making’ means agency process for
formulating, amending, or repealing a rule.”). In other words,
rulemaking is required for a “substantive” rule, but not for: “(A) . . .
interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of
agency organization, procedure, or practice; or (B) when the agency
for good cause finds . . . that notice and public procedure thereon
are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.”
5 U.S.C. § 553(b). The Supreme Court noted that the term
“‘substantive rule’ is not defined in the APA,” Chrysler Corp. v.
Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 301-02 (1979), but the Court has determined
that a substantive rule is “one ‘affecting individual rights and
obligations.’” Id. at 302 (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 232
(1974)). See also N.Y. State Elec. & Gas Corp. v. Saranac Power
Partners, L.P., 267 F.3d 128, 131 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Sweet v.
Sheehan, 235 F.3d 80, 91 (2d Cir. 2000) (substantive rules “are
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those that ‘create new law, right, or duties, in what amounts to a
legislative act’”).
EnerProg and EPA will argue that even if section 705 does
not override section 553, the rulemaking requirement does not
apply here because the suspension of the compliance date was not
substantive. To prove this point, the parties may analogize this
case to Sierra Club v. Jackson, in which the EPA issued a Delay
Notice staying the effective date of two rules regulating emission
standards under the Clean Air Act, relying on section 705 as its
authority. 833 F. Supp. 2d 11 (D. D.C. 2012). The court held that
“the Delay Notice does not constitute substantive rulemaking . . .
and therefore is not subject to notice and comment requirements,”
but ultimately found that the notice was arbitrary and capricious.
Id. at 29, 34. The court found:
[T]he Delay Notice simply preserves the status quo. A temporary stay to
preserve the status quo does not constitute a substantive rulemaking
because, by definition, it is not “designed to implement, interpret, or
prescribe law or policy.” . . . Such a stay is not designed to do anything other
than preserve the status quo.

Id. at 28 (quoting 5 U.S.C § 551(4) (citations omitted)).
Similarly, EnerProg and EPA will argue that the suspension
of the compliance date is to preserve the status quo. The Notice
stated: “This will preserve the regulatory status quo with respect
to wastestreams subject to the Rule’s new, and more stringent,
limitations and standards, while the litigation is pending and the
reconsideration is underway.” 82 Fed. Reg. at 19005. The
suspension was not substantive, as it simply retained the status
quo of the regulatory scheme prior to the 2015 ELGs, while the
ongoing litigation or the new notice and comment rulemaking were
concluded. As an indication of the temporary nature of this
suspension, EPA subsequently published a proposed rule
suspending the compliance dates until full reconsideration of the
rule is complete. Postponement of Certain Compliance Dates for
the Effluent Limitations Guidelines and Standards for the Steam
Electric Power Generating Point Source Category, 82 Fed Reg.
26017 (June 6, 2017). This suspension by rulemaking, and
intention to continue with further reconsideration, signals that the
EPA intended to use the section 705 suspension solely to maintain
the status quo until such actions were taken, and not as an
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indefinite measure that would constitute substantive rulemaking.
No substantive changes to the requirements of the rule, beyond a
mere postponement of compliance, were made.
FCW will respond by differentiating Sierra Club v. Jackson
from our case, in that Sierra Club involved the suspension of an
effective date, not a compliance date. See Becerra, 2017 WL
3891678, at *11. The difference in the effect of suspending a
compliance date is significant. The 2015 ELGs had already gone
into effect and industry groups had begun to invest in
infrastructure so as to meet the upcoming compliance deadlines.
See Becerra, 2017 WL 3891678, at *8. The D.C. Circuit held that
the deferral of a compliance deadline for mine safety regulations
was “in effect an amendment to a mandatory safety standard.”
Council of S. Mountains, Inc. v. Donovan, 653 F.2d 573, 579 n.26
(D.C. Cir. 1981). “[B]y deferring the requirement that coal
operators supply life-saving equipment to miners, it had ‘palpable
effects’ upon the regulated industry and the public in general.’” Id.
at 580 n.28 (quoting Nat’l Helium Corp. v. Fed. Energy Admin., 569
F.2d 1137, 1146 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1977). Similarly, here, the
effect of suspending the compliance deadline is substantive in that
it affects the obligations of regulated industries and the rights of
the public whom the promulgated rule considered. Furthermore,
Sierra Club v. Jackson is not binding on the Twelfth Circuit.
FCW may further argue that the suspension does not preserve
the status quo. As the Northern District of California found in
Becerra:
[The agency’s] suspension of the Rule did not merely “maintain the status
quo,” but instead prematurely restored a prior regulatory regime. . . .
Defendants’ interpretation would allow the agency broad latitude to delay
implementation long after a rule was formally noticed to the public as
taking effect by characterizing other later dates as compliance dates and
thereby retroactively abrogating the published effective date.

Becerra, 2017 WL 3891678, at *9. The suspension of a deadline for
the purposes of reevaluating the policy is not a matter of
preserving the status quo. In a dissenting opinion for the D.C.
Circuit, Judge Edwards explains: “Certainly a decision to suspend
indefinitely regulations that are the product of exhaustive study
and comprehensive rulemaking, in order to allow a wholesale
reevaluation of a major regulatory program, cannot be viewed as a
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temporary measure for preserving the status quo.” Public Citizen
v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 671 F.2d 518, 520 (D.C. Cir.
1981) (Edwards, J., dissenting). See also Public Citizen v. Steed,
733 F.2d 93, 98 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (a suspension that “will remain in
effect indefinitely unless and until the agency completes a full
notice and comment rulemaking proceeding to reinstate the . . .
program [is ‘a paradigm of a revocation’]”). “The value of notice and
comment prior to repeal of a final rule is that it ensures that an
agency will not undo all that it accomplished through its
rulemaking without giving all parties an opportunity to comment
on the wisdom of repeal.” Consumer Energy Council of Am. v.
FERC, 673 F.2d 425, 446 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
The Third Circuit also addressed the issue in Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency. 683 F.2d 752 (3d Cir. 1982). The court found that the
indefinite postponement of the effective date required rulemaking,
otherwise “it would mean that an agency could guide a future rule
through the rulemaking process, promulgate a final rule, and then
effectively repeal it, simply by indefinitely postponing its operative
date.”12 Id. at 762. See also Envtl. Defense Fund, Inc. v. Gorsuch,
713 F.2d 802, 815 (D.C. Cir. 1983); NRDC v. Abraham, 355 F.3d
179, 194 (2d Cir. 2004). A rule “without an effective date . . . would
be a nullity because it would never require compliance.” NRDC,
683 F.2d at 762. Similarly, an indefinite postponement of a
compliance date would also nullify a rule – therefore, rulemaking
is required.
Finally, FCW might note that any subsequent rulemaking
does not cure the error of invoking section 705 or failing to
undertake notice and comment rulemaking prior to the suspension
of the compliance date. Becerra, 2017 WL 3891678, at *11.

12. “By postponing the effective date of the amendments, EPA reversed its
course of action up to the postponement. That reversal itself constitutes a danger
signal. Where the reversal was accomplished without notice and an opportunity
for comment, and without any statement by EPA on the impact of that
postponement on the statutory scheme pursuant to which the amendments had
been promulgated, the reviewing court must scrutinize that action all the more
closely to insure that the APA was not violated.” NRDC, 683 F.2d at 760-61.
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RULEMAKING EXCEPTION: Do any exceptions to
the requirement for rulemaking apply?

Notice and comment is required for rulemaking, or the “agency
process for formulating, amending, or repealing a rule.” 5 U.S.C.
§ 551(5). The notice and comment rulemaking requirement does
not apply:
(A) to interpretive rules, general statements of policy, or rules of
agency organization, procedure, or practice; or
(B) when the agency for good cause finds (and incorporates the
finding and a brief statement of reasons therefor in the rules issued) that
notice and public procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or
contrary to the public interest.

5 U.S.C. § 553(b).
All parties should agree that the EPA did not seek to invoke
the good cause exception to the requirement for notice and
comment rulemaking when the agency suspended the compliance
date in the April 25, 2017 Notice. In order to invoke the good cause
exception, the agency must make a determination that the
procedure is “impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public
interest,” and must “include this finding and a short statement of
reasons with the new regulations.” Buschmann v. Schweiker, 676
F.2d 352, 356 (9th Cir. 1982); 5 U.S.C. § 553(b). The requirement
for express invocation is strict, as “the good cause exception is
essentially an emergency procedure.” Buschmann, 676 F.2d at 357.
See also United States v. Valverde, 628 F.3d 1159, 1164 (9th Cir.
2010) (“The Agency must overcome a high bar if it seeks to invoke
the good cause exception to bypass the notice and comment
requirement.”); Alcaraz v. Block, 746 F.2d 593, 612 (9th Cir. 1984);
Nat’l Fed’n of Fed. Emps. v. Devine, 671 F.2d 607, 610 (D.C. Cir.
1982); N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. U.S. EPA, 626 F.2d 1038, 1046
(D.C. Cir. 1980); U.S. Steel Corp. v. U.S. EPA, 595 F.2d 207, 214
(1979). If the agency has not included such a finding, the court
“may not supply a reasoned basis for the agency’s action that the
agency itself has not given.” N.C. Growers’ Ass’n v. United Farm
Workers, 702 F.3d 755, 767 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Motor Vehicle
Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
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The EPA did not expressly invoke the good cause exception to
the requirement for notice and comment rulemaking. EnerProg
will note that EPA did cite the mounting “capital expenditures that
facilities incurring costs under the Rule will undertake in order to
meet the new, more stringent limitations and standards in the
Rule, . . . [therefore] justice requires it to postpone the compliance
dates.” 82 Fed. Reg. at 19005. However, this was unlikely an
attempt to invoke the good cause exception, and if it were, it was
not sufficient. No other exceptions to the requirement are
applicable.
IX.

RELIANCE
ON
BEST
PROFESSIONAL
JUDGEMENT: Can EPA Region XII rely on BPJ as an
alternative ground to require zero discharge of coal
ash transport wastes?

Before the EAB, EnerProg challenged the permit writer’s
reliance on Best Professional Judgment as an alternative ground
(if the 2015 ELGs were properly suspended) for requiring MEGS
to implement dry handling of bottom and fly ash wastes in order to
achieve zero discharge of toxic pollutants associated with these
wastes by November 1, 2018. The EAB responded to this issue,
despite the fact that “this [BPJ] requirement does not currently
have any practical effect on the permit requirements.” R. at 11. The
EAB found that the reliance on BPJ was justified because 40
C.F.R. section 125.3(c)(3) specifically provides for the use of BPJ
for pollutants not covered by the ELGs for an industry category:
“[w]here promulgated effluent limitation guidelines only apply to
certain aspects of a discharger’s operation, or to certain pollutants,
other aspects or activities are subject to regulation on a case-bycase basis.” 40 C.F.R. § 125.3(c)(3). It is undisputed that the
effluent from the MEGS coal ash pond contains toxic pollutants
such as mercury, arsenic, and selenium, that are not regulated by
the 1982 ELGs. R. at 11. See Steam Electric Power Generating
Point Source Category; Effluent Limitations Guidelines,
Pretreatment Standards and New Source Performance Standards,
47 Fed. Reg. 52290, 52303 (Nov. 19, 1982).
On appeal, EnerProg has a strong argument that the EAB’s
determination that the reliance on BPJ was justified was arbitrary
and capricious because the toxic pollutants were “considered” by the
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EPA in the 1982 ELGs, and the pollutants at issue were properly
covered by the 2015 ELGs at the time this NPDES permit was
issued. FCW and EPA will argue that the EAB decision was not
arbitrary and capricious because the toxic pollutants, while
considered in the 1982 ELGs, can now be properly treated by
technology that has since developed.
Generally, NPDES permits include:
all applicable ELGs promulgated by the EPA for the pertinent category or
subcategory. . . . In situations where the EPA has not yet promulgated any
ELGs for the point source category or subcategory, NPDES permits must
incorporate “such conditions as the Administrator determines are
necessary to carry out the provisions of [the CWA].”

Tex. Oil & Gas Ass’n v. U.S. EPA, 161 F.3d 923, 928-29 (5th Cir.
1998) (footnotes and citations omitted) (quoting 33 U.S.C.
§ 1342(a)(1)). “[I]n the true absence of an applicable Guideline,
permitters are obliged to engage in BPJ analysis in order to satisfy
the Act’s requirement of appropriate technology-based effluent
limits.” Louisville Gas & Electric Co. v. Ky. Waterways Alliance,
517 S.W.3d 479, 491 (Ky. 2017). Thus, the permit writer will
exercise her best professional judgment to fill in these gaps in such
a way that will meet the goals of the statute.13 NPDES regulations
provide guidance on how these determinations should be made:
(c)(2) On a case-by-case basis under section 402(a)(1) of the
Act, to the extent that EPA-promulgated effluent limitations are
inapplicable. The permit writer shall apply the appropriate factors
listed in § 125.3(d) and shall consider: (i) The appropriate
technology for the category or class of point sources of which the
applicant is a member, based upon all available information; and
(ii) Any unique factors relating to the applicant. . . . (d) In setting
case-by-case limitations pursuant to § 125.3(c), the permit writer
must consider the following factors . . . (3) For BAT requirements:
(i) The age of equipment and facilities involved; (ii) The process
13. “In the absence of national standards, the Act authorizes the
Administrator to issue permits on ‘such conditions as the Administrator
determines are necessary to carry out the provisions of [the Act].’ However, in
issuing permits on a case-by-case basis using its ‘Best Professional Judgment,’
EPA does not have unlimited discretion in establishing permit effluent
limitations.” NRDC v. U.S. EPA, 863 F.2d 1420, 1425 (9th Cir. 1988) (insertion in
original) (citation omitted).
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employed; (iii) The engineering aspects of the application of various
types of control techniques; (iv) Process changes; (v) The cost of
achieving such effluent reduction; and (vi) Non-water quality
environmental impact (including energy requirements).
40 C.F.R. § 125.3. In their analysis, the permit writer
considered that dry handling of bottom ash and fly ash has been in
use at existing plants in the industry for many years. R. at 9. The
permit writer also noted that MEGS is sufficiently profitable to
adopt dry handling of these wastes with zero liquid discharges,
with no more than a twelve cents per month increase in the
average consumer’s electric bill. Id. EnerProg might argue that
the EPA did not consider all the required factors listed in 40 C.F.R.
section 125.3(d) based on their absence from the record. Therefore,
the permit writer improperly employed BPJ.
EPA and FCW will note, as the EAB also determined, that if
the compliance date for the 2015 ELGs is properly suspended, the
current applicable guidelines are the 1982 ELGs for the Steam
Electric Power Generating Point Source Category. See Daniel H.
Conrad, Filling the Gap: The Retroactive Effect of Vacating Agency
Regulations, 29 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 3 (2011). The parties will
argue that the provision for employing BPJ does not just apply to
the broader category of point sources, but also to specific
pollutants. The most recent NPDES Permit Writers’ Manual
explains:
When effluent guidelines are available for the industry category, but no
effluent guidelines requirements are available for the pollutant of
concern . . . . The permit writer should make sure that the pollutant of
concern is not already controlled by the effluent guidelines and was not
considered by EPA when the Agency developed the effluent guidelines.

U.S. EPA, NPDES PERMIT WRITERS’ MANUAL § 5.2.3.2 at 5-45-546 (Sept. 2010). See also Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 517 S.W.3d at
488 (“In the case . . . where an existing ELG applies to some part
or aspect of the applicant’s discharge, but the existing ELG leaves
other parts or aspects of the discharge unaddressed, then the
permit writer applies the Guideline to the extent possible, and
employs the BPJ analysis to the extent necessary, to arrive at
appropriate technology-based effluent limits.”). Therefore, even
though the MEGS point source category is covered by the 1982
ELGs, toxic pollutants in bottom and fly ash wastes are not
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regulated by the 1982 ELGs – a fact that is undisputed by the
parties. R. at 11.
However, EPA and FCW must also establish that these
pollutants were not “considered” by the EPA when the 1982 ELGs
were developed. The EPA explained, in the 1982 ELGs, that these
pollutants, among others, were “excluded from national regulation
because they are present in amounts too small to be effectively
reduced by technologies known to the Administrator.” Steam
Electric Power Generating Point Source Category; Effluent
Limitations Guidelines, Pretreatment Standards and New Source
Performance Standards, 47 Fed. Reg. 52290, 52303 (Nov. 19, 1982).
Courts have found that an agency’s determination that current
technology cannot meaningfully reduce the amount of a pollutant
serves as “consideration.” Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 517 S.W.3d
at 488-89; NRDC v. Pollution Control Bd., 37 N.E.3d 407, 414 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2015). EPA and FCW might try to overcome this by noting
that the available technology has changed since the issuance of the
1982 ELGs, therefore it is appropriate that the permit writer
consider the current available technology – and it should be noted
that EnerProg has not established that compliance with a zerodischarge standard for these pollutants was not feasible. R. at 11.
But see Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 517 S.W.3d at 490 (suggesting
that the appropriate remedy would be to bring suit against the
EPA for failing to comply with its mandatory duty to timely review
ELGs).
EnerProg will further argue that at the time the permit was
finalized (January 18, 2017), the 2015 ELGs were still in place and
covered the toxic pollutants in bottom and fly ash wastes. The
NPDES regulations only authorize the permit writer to employ
best professional judgment when “EPA-promulgated effluent
limitations are inapplicable.” 40 C.F.R. § 125.3(c)(2). The
regulations do not authorize the permit writer to use BPJ to
establish standards in the case where those standards already
existed.
EnerProg might also argue that given anticipated
reconsideration of the rule, it was not appropriate for the permit
writer to rely on BPJ and establish an alternate ground for zero
discharge of these pollutants. Given that, upon the finalization of
this permit, several cases challenging the 2015 ELGs had already
been filed and the transition of administrations was imminent,
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EnerProg might reasonably argue that this regulatory scheme (the
2015 ELGs) were due to be reconsidered. This argument requires
an extension of an argument found in Louisville Gas and Electric
Company, where the court explained that “a permitter may defer
the BPJ exercise so as to avoid issuing a permit not in keeping with
national standards.” 571 S.W.3d at 491. See also NRDC v. U.S.
EPA, 863 F.2d 1420, 1427-28 (9th Cir. 1988). The court found that
it was reasonable for the permitter to refrain from exercising BPJ
where the “EPA [was] apparently poised to issue a new national
Guidelines.”14 Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 571 S.W.3d at 491. Thus,
a permit writer is permitted to not exercise BPJ, but the
permissive language implies that the permit writer would not be
abusing her discretion if she did exercise BPJ regardless of
impending rulemaking. This argument relies on a degree of
speculation as to what was forthcoming, given that no rulemaking
had been initiated. The argument also would result in the freezing
of the authority of an agency upon an impending transition of
administrations, by limiting the exercise of judgment by permit
writers.
X.

NPDES PERMIT: Is a NPDES permit required for the
pollutant discharges into the ash pond?

Before the EAB, FCW asserted that the discharges from
outfall 008 to the coal ash pond15 should not be considered internal
discharges, but rather should be treated as a direct discharge to
the waters of the United States that requires implementation of
effluent limits under CWA sections 301(b) and 402. FCW argued
that the July 21, 1980 suspension should not be given effect
because it lacked statutory authorization and failed to comply with
the requirements of section 553 of the APA.

14. The facts of Louisville Gas and Electric Company v. Kentucky Waterways
Alliance run parallel to this case, yet the decision made by the permit writer
diverges from the EPA here. 517 S.W.3d 479 (Ky. 2017). In Louisville Gas, the
permit writer did not exercise BPJ, citing pending rulemaking. Here, EnerProg
would be arguing that the EPA should not have exercised BPJ because of pending
rulemaking.
15. The coal ash pond was impounded from Fossil Creek, a perennial
tributary to the Progress River, a navigable-in-fact interstate body of water, for
the purposes of waste treatment. R. at 7.
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The EAB declined to disturb the longstanding policy judgment
of successive EPA administrations. The July 21, 1980 suspension
of this language has been in effect for over 35 years, having been
reincorporated in two subsequent reconsiderations of section
122.2. Therefore, no effluent limitations are required for internal
outfall 008, as it does not discharge into a water of the United
States as that term is defined in the regulations. FCW appeals this
determination.
On appeal, FCW will argue that the EAB was arbitrary and
capricious in failing to consider that the suspension of the exception
was ineffective given that notice and comment rulemaking was
required. Therefore, the coal ash pond is a water of the United
States, and a NPDES permit is required for the internal outfall 008.
EnerProg and EPA will argue that the EAB was not arbitrary or
capricious in their determination, and that the statute of
limitations for challenging the 1980 suspension has since passed,
as well as this being the inappropriate venue or remedy.
FCW will argue that the suspension of the exception that
would bring the ash pond back within the definition of “waters of
the United States” required notice and comment rulemaking. See
section V(C), supra, for the legal authorities describing the notice
and comment rulemaking requirement for substantive
rulemaking. In sum, as the Supreme Court held in Chrysler
Corporation v. Brown, a substantive rule is “one ‘affecting
individual rights and obligations.’” 441 U.S. at 302 (quoting
Morton, 415 U.S. at 232). FCW will argue that the suspension
effectively terminates certain obligations regarding CWA
requirements by removing a category of a body of water from the
jurisdiction of the statute. The definition of “waters of the United
States” lies at the heart of the CWA, underlying the two core
permitting schemes (section 402 NPDES permits and section 404
dredge and fill permits). See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1342, 1344. Any
amendment to this definition alters the obligations of a potential
permittee and qualifies as a substantive rulemaking. As seen here,
it dictates whether or not a permit is required for a discharge.
Therefore, the suspension of this exception was not effective. With
no such suspension, the ash pond falls outside the jurisdiction of
section 301, and no permit is required for the discharge of
pollutants into it.
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FCW might also note the purpose of the exemption exception
included in the notice of its promulgation: “Because [the] CWA was
not intended to license dischargers to freely use waters of the
United States as waste treatment systems, the definition makes
clear that treatment systems created in those waters or from their
impoundment remain waters of the United States.” Consolidated
Permit Regulations, 45 Fed. Reg. 33290, 33298 (May 19, 1980). The
suspension, however, removes these waste treatment
impoundments from the definition of WOTUS. This suspension is
not merely interpretational; rather, again, it affects rights and
obligations. EnerProg and EPA might cite to West Virginia Coal
Association v. Reilly, in which the district court agreed with the
EPA’s argument that the exception was “not definitional, rather it
was merely explanatory in nature,” therefore the “definitional
mandate” was unaffected by the suspension. 728 F. Supp. 1276,
1290 (S.D. W.V. 1989).
Similar to the application in section V(D), supra, the good
cause exception to rulemaking was not properly invoked by the
EPA in making the suspension. While the EPA supplied a brief
statement of its reasoning for suspending the exception, it does not
relate this statement to the good cause exception or to an inability
to employ notice and comment rulemaking. Even if this were an
invocation of the good cause exception, the EPA would have since
been required to conduct notice and comment rulemaking. In
American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO v. Block,
the D.C. Circuit held that “once an emergency situation has been
eased by the promulgation of interim rules, it is crucial that the
comprehensive permanent regulations which follow emerge as a
result of the congressionally-mandated policy of affording public
participation that is embodied in section 553.” 655 F.2d 1153, 1158
(D.C. Cir. 1981).
After FCW establishes that the suspension was ineffective,
and that the ash pond is a water of the United States subject to
section 301, the party must also establish that the other elements
of section 402 are met, such that a NPDES permit is required for
internal outfall 008 which discharges into the ash pond. A section
402 NPDES permit is required for any discharge of pollutants into
waters of the United States from a point source. See 33 U.S.C.
§ 1311(a) (“Except in compliance with this section and section[] . . .
1342 of this title, the discharge of any pollutant by any person shall
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be unlawful.”); 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (“Discharge of a pollutant means:
(a) Any addition of any ‘pollutant’ or combination of pollutants to
‘waters of the United States’ from any ‘point source’ . . . . Point
source means any discernible, confined, and discrete
conveyance . . . .” Also, defining “waters of the United States” as
described herein.). Fly ash and bottom ash wastes, containing toxic
pollutants, are discharged from MEGS via internal outfall 008, a
discrete conveyance, into the coal ash pond. R. at 8. This discharge
clearly meets the other elements of the section 402 permit
requirement.
EnerProg and EPA might cite support for the EAB’s
deferential treatment of the EPA’s longstanding policy judgment.
See, e.g., Skidmore v. Swift Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (“We
consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the
Administrator under this Act, while not controlling upon the courts
by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and
informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly
resort for guidance.”); Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S.
Ct. 2517 (2013) (longstanding agency views entitled to deference);
Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 563 U.S. 1, 1516 (2011) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 50 (“The
length of time the agencies have held them suggests that they
reflect careful consideration, not ‘post hoc rationalizatio[n].’”).
EnerProg and EPA will argue that even if notice and
comment rulemaking was required, the statute of limitations for
challenging the ineffective suspension has long passed. 28 U.S.C.
section 2401(a) establishes the statute of limitations for civil suits
brought against the United States: “[E]very civil action commenced
against the United States shall be barred unless the complaint it
filed within six years after the right of action first accrues.” 28
U.S.C. § 2401(a). This statute of limitations applies to claims
brought under the APA. Sierra Club v. Penfold, 857 F.2d 1307,
1315 (9th Cir. 1988).
An APA claim against the EPA for failure to employ notice and
comment rulemaking for the 1980 suspension first accrued upon
the date of notice of the suspension (July 21, 1980). Consolidated
Permit Regulations, 45 Fed. Reg. 48620 (July 21, 1980). In Herr v.
U.S. Forest Service, the Sixth Circuit explains:
A classic example would be an agency that issues a rule
without following all requirements of notice-and-comment
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rulemaking. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c). This denial of process to the
public at large violates the statute, and any party concretely
injured by the action (say, a party who has to pay a fee because of
the rule) may sue to correct that wrong. The clock for the injured
party begins to tick the moment the agency took its final action
because the agency’s lack of notice-and-comment rulemaking
already legally injured the party. 803 F.3d 809, 820 (6th Cir. 2015).
Furthermore, “[a]ctual knowledge of government action . . . is not
required for a statutory period to commence.” Shiny Rock Min.
Corp. v. United States, 906 F.2d 1362, 1364 (9th Cir. 1990).
Because the six-year statute of limitations has since long-passed,
FCW can no longer challenge the 1980 suspension. A challenge of
the NDPES permit is also not the appropriate venue for this
challenge against the EPA’s 1980 suspension.
FCW may respond by stating that it can still bring a timely
as-applied challenge, despite the fact that the suspension was
issued in 1980. The agency action was not “final” for the purposes
of judicial review until the issuance of the NPDES permit here.
The Supreme Court has identified four factors for determining
when agency action is final: (1) whether the challenged action is a
definitive statement of the agency’s position, (2) whether the action
has the status of law with penalties for noncompliance, (3) whether
the impact on the plaintiff is direct and immediate, and (4) whether
the agency expects immediate compliance. Dunn-McCampbell
Royalty Interest, Inc. v. Nat’l Parl Serv., 112 F.3d 1283, 1288 (5th
Cir. 1997) (emphasis added) (citing Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387
U.S. 136, 149-53 (1967), overruled on other grounds, Califano v.
Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977)). The Fifth Circuit has held “that when
an agency applies a rule, the limitations period running from the
rule’s publication will not bar a claimant from challenging the
agency’s statutory authority. . . . [Many Circuit Court decisions]
stand for the proposition that an agency’s application of a rule to a
party creates a new, six-year cause of action to challenge to the
agency’s constitutional or statutory authority.” Dunn-McCampbell
Royalty Interest, Inc., 112 F.3d at 1287. See Wind River Mining
Corp. v. United States, 946 F.2d 710, 715 (9th Cir. 1991); Public
Citizen v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 901 F.2d 147, 152 (D.C. Cir.
1990); Texas v. United States, 749 F.2d 1144, 1146 (5th Cir. 1985).
The issuance of the NPDES permit served as the final agency
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action relevant to FCW, restarting the statute of limitations sixyear clock; therefore FCW can still challenge the 1980 suspension.
XI.

SECTION 404 PERMIT: Does the ash pond closure
and capping require a permit for the discharge of fill
material pursuant to section 404?

Before the EAB, FCW claimed that even if the section 122.2
exclusion from the definition of “waters of the United States”
applies for the purpose of a section 402 permit for the discharge of
pollutants, once the coal ash pond is closed, it no longer qualifies
as a waste treatment system. Therefore, both the abandonment of
the remaining coal ash and the placement of an impermeable cap
constitute the discharge of fill material requiring a permit under
CWA section 404. The EAB held that the exclusion does not contain
any recapture provision that would convert the ash pond back into
waters of the United States upon its retirement. Since the
discharges to the ash pond do not require a section 402 permit, and
since the jurisdictional definition of the waters of the United States
is the same for section 402 and 404 permitting, the EAB reasoned,
no section 404 permit is required for the ash pond closure and
capping activities.
On appeal, FCW will argue, as above, that the 1980 suspension
was not valid, therefore a section 404 permit is required. EnerProg
and EPA have the stronger argument here. These parties will argue
that the correct definition (for the Army Corps) clearly states that
the coal ash pond is not a water of the United States, and the
definition does not include a recapture provision.
FCW might first argue, relying on their arguments detailed in
the section above, that the suspension of the exception to the
exclusion of 40 C.F.R. section 122.2 was never valid. Therefore, the
ash pond is a water of the United States, subject to the requirement
for a 404 permit. Section 404 of the Clean Water Act describes the
permitting scheme for “the discharge of dredged or fill material
into the navigable waters at specific disposal sites” administered
by the Army Corps of Engineers. 33 U.S.C. § 1344. FCW argues,
as it did before the EAB, that the closure and capping of the coal
ash pond requires a section 404 permit, as these actions constitute
the discharge of fill material. The regulatory definition of “fill” as:
“material placed in waters of the United States where the material
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has the effect of: (i) Replacing any portion of a water of the United
States with dry land; or (ii) Changing the bottom elevation of any
portion of a water of the United States.” 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(e)(1)
(2017). The capping of the ash pond will both replace the coal ash
pond, which was impounded from Fossil Creek, with dry land, and
will change the bottom elevation. Therefore, the closure of the coal
ash pond requires a section 404 permit. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1344.
EnerProg and EPA will respond that regardless of whether
the suspension in 40 C.F.R. section 122.2 is valid, the relevant
definition for the purposes of section 404 permit requirements is
the Army Corps definition found at 33 C.F.R. section 328.3,
contrary to the holding of the EAB. 40 C.F.R. section 122.2 only
applies to the 402 permitting program. Here, the history is much
simpler. In this definition, “waters of the United States” do not
include “[w]aste treatment systems, including ponds or lagoons
designed to meet the requirements of the Clean Water Act.” 33
C.F.R. § 328.3(b)(1). There is no exclusion or exception listed. By
the plain language of the regulation, the ash pond is not a “water
of the United States,” and not subject to the section 404 permit
requirement.
The EAB held that 40 C.F.R. section 122.2 exception does not
include a recapture provision. EnerProg and EPA will note that
the same can be said for the Army Corps definition (33 C.F.R.
§ 328.3). The language of both 40 C.F.R. section 122.2 and 33
C.F.R. section 328.3(b)(1) do not indicate that the exclusions are
temporary, whilst the waste treatment purpose is in effect. The
Supreme Court has stated that courts should “ordinarily resist
reading words or elements into a statute that do not appear on its
face.” Bates v. United States, 522 U.S. 23, 29 (1997). See also
Stanton Rd. Assocs. v. Lohrey Enters., 984 F.2d 1015, 1020 (9th Cir.
1993). The Proposed Rule explicitly stated, in reference to the
exclusion of waste treatment systems, among other exclusions:
“There is no recapture provision for these excluded waters in the
proposal.” Definition of “Waters of the United States” Under the
Clean Water Act; Proposed Rule. 79 Fed. Reg. 22187, 22189 (Apr.
21, 2014). This holds true for the final rule.
A comment on the proposed rule urged the agencies to include
a recapture provision for the excluded waters, indicating that “the
permanency of these exclusions [was unsupported] with science.”
U.S. EPA, Clean Water Rule Comment Compendium, Topic 7:
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Features and Waters Not Jurisdictional 47 (June 2015).16 The EPA
responded: “The agencies believe the exclusions contained in the
final rule provide a balance between protection and clarity that is
reasonable and consistent with the statute’s goals and objectives.”
Id. at 23. Furthermore, Congress chose to include a recapture
provision for a separate category of waters, therefore its absence
for the category at issue is more significant. See 33 U.S.C.
§ 1344(f)(2).
FCW might make a policy argument to support their
contention that the ash pond should revert into a water of the
United States upon termination of its use for waste treatment. The
party may argue that the definitional exclusion clearly states the
purpose of these ponds as serving as waste treatment systems to
meet the requirements of the Clean Water Act.
This is not intended to be an exhaustive analysis of the
problem, merely an indicative list of issues to be discussed in teams’
written submissions and oral arguments. One should appreciate
reasoned and reasonable creativity and ideas beyond those in this
limited analysis.

16.
Available
at
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/201506/documents/cwr_response_to_comments_7_njd.pdf.
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SAMPLE QUESTIONS FOR JUDGES
These questions are suggested as a starting point. Please feel
free to develop your own.
Issue 1: Did the Final Permit properly include conditions
requiring closure and remediation of the coal ash pond as
provided by the State of Progress in the section 401
certification?
Issue 1(a): Does the EPA or federal court have the authority
to review section 401 state certification conditions?
EnerProg and EPA
1. Under section 401 and its implementing regulations, who
has jurisdiction to review section 401 conditions?
2. Why should this court ignore this jurisdictional grant
[requiring review of section 401 certification conditions to
be in state courts]?
3. Even if due process requires a judicial or administrative
avenue for review of these conditions, why should review be
in federal courts or administrative proceedings, rather than
the appropriate remedy be in state courts?
FCW
1. What is the EPA’s proper remedy when it does not approve
of certification conditions?
2. Given that there are no available channels of state review
in Progress, why should the section 401 certification
conditions not be reviewable by federal judicial or
administrative means? [Why shouldn’t this court following
the reasoning in Consolidation Coal?]
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Issue 1(b): Were the section 401 state certification
conditions appropriate?
EnerProg
1. How should this court define “appropriate requirements of
State law?” What are the bounds of “water quality
standards” as they pertain to section 401 conditions?
2. Why does the capping and closure requirement fall outside
of these bounds?
3. Does a narrow definition of “water quality standards”
properly serve the purpose of the CWA and section 401
conditions?
4. If these requirements will still apply to the coal ash pond,
under CACA, why is it important that they also not be
included in Progress’ section 401 certification?
FCW and EPA
1. What are the bounds of “appropriate requirements” or
“water quality standards” such that conditions included in
section 401 certifications are appropriately limited? How
should this court define these terms in order to rationally
and reasonably limit their scope?
2. How do the closure and capping conditions relate to water
quality standards?
3. How do state section 401 conditions, and corresponding
state review, comport with the authority of the CWA over
the issuance of NPDES permits?
Issue 2: Did the April 25, 2017 EPA Notice effectively
suspend permit compliance deadlines for achieving zero
discharge of coal ash transport water?
Issue 2(a): Was the invocation of section 705 to suspend the
compliance date proper and adequately justified?
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EnerProg and EPA
1. Why should section 705 apply to “compliance dates,” when
the statute clearly states that it applies to “effective
dates?” Why should this court consider an expanded view
of this term?
2. How was the section 705 suspension based on “pending
litigation” when the litigation was stayed prior to the
issuance of the Notice?
3. Was the EPA required to apply the four-part preliminary
injunction test to a postponement under section 705? If not,
what is the justification for EPA to depart from the longstanding practice of employing this test?
4. What is the appropriate test to evaluate whether “justice
so requires”?
FCW
1. If the purpose of section 705 is to maintain the status quo
pending litigation, why should the term “compliance date”
not be read broadly?
2. What is the “status quo” to be maintained as applicable
here?
3. Was the section 705 suspension made based on “pending
litigation”?
4. Was EPA required to apply the four-part preliminary
injunction test to a postponement under section 705?
Issue 2(b): Was notice and comment rulemaking required?
EnerProg and EPA
1. Does section 705 replace the notice and comment
rulemaking requirement? [Can a statute override a
separate statutory duty simply by failing to reference it?]
2. How does the suspension of a compliance date preserve the
status quo?
3. How is the suspension of an already effective rule not a
substantive rulemaking?
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4. Why should this court not follow the reasoning set forth in
Becerra, which held that suspension of a deadline for the
purposes of reevaluating the policy is not a matter of
preserving the status quo?
5. How is this suspension not an effective repeal of the rule?
FCW
1. Does section 705 replace the notice and comment
rulemaking requirement? Does requiring notice and
commenting rulemaking for a section 705 suspension
undermine the suspension’s purpose?
2. Why does the suspension of a compliance date differ from
the suspension of an effective date, as related to whether
it is a substantive rulemaking?
3. Did the EPA properly invoke the good cause exception to
the notice and comment rulemaking requirement?
Issue 3: Can EPA Region XII rely on BPJ as an alternative
ground to require zero discharge of coal ash transport
wastes?
EnerProg
1. When is it appropriate to rely on BPJ?
2. Is the reliance on BPJ permissible where ELGS exist for
an industry category, but not for a specific pollutant within
that category? (Does “no applicable ELGS” refer to only
ELGs for a particular industry, or more specifically to
pollutants within ELGs for an industry?)
3. Did the EPA “consider” these pollutants when establishing
the 1982 ELGs?
4. Given the changes in available technology since 1982, why
should EPA not be permitted to use BPJ to establish
standards?
FCW and EPA
1. When is it appropriate to rely on BPJ?
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2. Why should the EPA’s conclusions [in the 1982 ELGs] that
these pollutants should not be regulated because thenexisting technologies cannot effectively reduce them not
constitute as “consideration”?
3. Is EPA permitted to establish BPJ standards when ELGs
were currently in place for those pollutants at the time the
permit was issued, yet expected to be subject to
litigation/reconsideration?
4. What factors does a permit writer need to consider when
relying on BPJ, and did the permit writer, in this case,
consider all appropriate factors?
Issue 4: Is a NPDES permit required for the pollutant
discharges into the ash pond?
EnerProg and EPA
1. Does the ash pond constitute a “water of the United
States”?
2. Was rulemaking required for the suspension of the
exception that would bring the ash pond back within the
definition of “waters of the United States”?
FCW
1. Why was the exception not merely explanatory, therefore
rendering its suspension non-substantive (and not subject
to notice and comment rulemaking)?
2. Why should this court depart from EPA’s longstanding
policy judgment of considering such ash ponds as outside
of the definition of “waters of the United States”?
3. Did EPA meet the requirements of the “good cause”
exception to rulemaking?
4. Is the challenge of this suspension timely?
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Issue 5: Does the ash pond closure and capping require a
permit for the discharge of fill material pursuant to section
404?
EnerProg and EPA
1. What is the appropriate “waters of the United States”
definition for this issue?
2. Can the status of a wastewater treatment system change
when its use is terminated?
3. Why should this court not read into the “waters of the
United States” definition a recapture provision, as a matter
of public policy?
FCW
1. Why should this court not look to the Army Corps
definition of “waters of the United States”?
2. Why should the court rely on the EPA’s definition of
“waters of the United States,” when the Army Corps has
its own definition?
3. Is this court permitted to read a recapture provision into
this definition?
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